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Abstract
Persons have different value preferences. Neuroimaging studies where value-based decisions in actual conflict situations
were investigated suggest an important role of prefrontal and cingulate brain regions. General preferences, however, reflect
a superordinate moral concept independent of actual situations as proposed in psychological and socioeconomic research.
Here, the specific brain response would be influenced by abstract value systems and moral concepts. The neurobiological
mechanisms underlying such responses are largely unknown. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) with a
forced-choice paradigm on word pairs representing abstract values, we show that the brain handles such decisions
depending on the person’s superordinate moral concept. Persons with a predominant collectivistic (altruistic) value system
applied a ‘‘balancing and weighing’’ strategy, recruiting brain regions of rostral inferior and intraparietal, and midcingulate
and frontal cortex. Conversely, subjects with mainly individualistic (egocentric) value preferences applied a ‘‘fight-and-flight’’
strategy by recruiting the left amygdala. Finally, if subjects experience a value conflict when rejecting an alternative
congruent to their own predominant value preference, comparable brain regions are activated as found in actual moral
dilemma situations, i.e., midcingulate and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Our results demonstrate that superordinate moral
concepts influence the strategy and the neural mechanisms in decision processes, independent of actual situations,
showing that decisions are based on general neural principles. These findings provide a novel perspective to future
sociological and economic research as well as to the analysis of social relations by focusing on abstract value systems as
triggers of specific brain responses.
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Introduction
Research on value systems is of interest in disciplines such as
psychology, sociology, socioeconomics, and related fields. Abstract
values represent persons’ concepts serving as a general framework
for any evaluation preceding decisions and actions [1–3]. Based on
the pioneering work of Piaget [4] and Kohlberg [5] on value
research in its present form, two lines of value theories emerged:
Value typologies provide different dimensions on which values are
based [2–3,6–7], without any hierarchical ranking. One of the
most robust dimensions is ‘individualism’ vs. ‘collectivism’ [6–8].
Individualists are understood as persons, who prefer an egocentric
strategy by exerting their own strengths and abilities for personal
success, whereas collectivists rely on an altruistic strategy,
relationships to other people, and ranking obligations and duties
higher than their personal needs. Hierarchical theories rank values
according to their importance for the individual or to the
complexity of the values [1,5,9]. As a synopsis of these two
opposing positions, a third line emerged which integrates
typological and hierarchical concepts. It states that different
hierarchies of values exist in parallel, between which subjects shift
depending on their social and professional situation [10–11].
Independent of a particular value theory, it is widely accepted
that values and personal ideals influence a person’s mindset and
behaviour. Neuroscience touched this topic by investigating the
neural correlates of moral judgement and morality [12–14],
primarily assessing decision processes in actual dilemma situations.
These studies assessed how people decide between two options in a
morally challenging situation. Here, brain areas within the frontal
and cingulate cortex were found to be involved. The abstract value
system of the person, however, was not investigated. Instead, the
persons’ value system was assessed indirectly, using actual
situations in which a normal person would weigh the possible
alternatives with respect to the competing moral values. But moral
judgement in general should involve a broader range of values as
stated in different value theories [1–9], and should be relevant not
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only to moral dilemma, but also to most decisions in every day life
[1,15]. Thus, it might be expected that principles of decision
making found in actual moral dilemma situations only show one
aspect of a moral general decision principle in humans which is
based on each person’s value concept.
Thus, assessing such an influence of an abstract value system on
human behaviour should address the neural processing of concepts
independent from an actual situation [12]. Dealing with abstract
values might involve comparable brain areas as recruited in moral
judgement tasks, such as the dorsolateral prefrontal, medial
frontal, and anterior to midcingulate cortex. But it remains elusive
how activation in these brain regions might be modulated
depending on different moral concepts in different persons.
In a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study on
word pairs representing abstract values, we assessed the question
how a person’s mindset and thus, his or her way of decision
making is influenced by the person’s predominant value profile.
We could indeed reveal differential neural strategies in different
persons.
Results and Discussion
Behavioural analysis
We performed functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
in 38 healthy subjects (21 male, 17 female). Stimuli were visually
presented words representing abstract values at different levels of
complexity (Fig. 1, Table 1), based on the integrating value
theories [10–11].
Each word was assigned to one of two types of values,
‘individualistic’ (e.g., ‘power’, ‘autonomy’) and ‘collectivistic’
(e.g., ‘tradition’, ‘community’), each of which encompassed three
levels of increasing complexity. The hierarchy of complexity
started with a first level of values relevant to family and self,
followed by a second level with reference to the peer-group of a
person, and reached the third level with values related to mankind
(Fig. 1, Table 1). Stimuli were presented as pairs of words from
different or the same levels and types, giving a total of 540 trials.
Subjects were instructed to spontaneously select the most
appealing word in each word pair by button press (forced-choice
situation).
Subjects responded in nearly 100% of the trials (mean of missed
trials: 6 out of 540). The profile of choices was analysed for each
subject to test whether persons could generally be differentiated
into groups with differing value preferences. Using a two-step
cluster-analysis, subjects were assigned to two groups, one with
preference of ‘individualistic’ values (IND; n=14 subjects; 10
male), and the other with preference of ‘collectivistic’ values (COL;
n=24 subjects; 11 male). In a 2 (value orientation of group) x 2
(value orientation of stimulus) ANOVA, groups differed signifi-
cantly (all P,0.001) in their choices for first and third level words
of the collectivistic type, and first and second level words of the
individualistic type (Fig. 1). Groups did not differ with regard to
their age and IQ (Table 2), neither overall or with sex as covariate.
Since a correlation between personal ideals and personality
structure was discussed controversially in different value theories
[1–11], all subjects were tested on a five-dimensional personality
scale (NEO-FFI). Individualists and collectivists only differed
significantly in the dimension ‘Conscientiousness’, with collectivists
scoring higher on this dimension (Table 2).
The groups as revealed by the two-step cluster analysis represent
a distinction in accordance with the value theories, showing a
subdivision of subjects on the typological dimension ‘individualism
vs. collectivism’. Thus, based on the value theories, one would
expect reaction times to differ between the stimuli. In his value
study, Graves [11] showed that subjects would react faster to
stimulus words in accordance with their own mindset than to
words which do not belong to their own mindset. Thus, we
analysed the reaction times (RTs) of the subjects by dividing the
respective trials into those where subjects chose a word according
to their own overall value profile, and those where subjects chose a
word not representing their overall value profile. RTs were scaled
for each subject individually by the mean RT across all trials since
RTs differed considerably between subjects. Scaled RTs then
entered an ANOVA to test whether RTs differed significantly for
the above mentioned choice types. ANOVA was significant at
P,0.0001 (F1,48=45.46) for factor ‘choice type’. Figure 2 shows
the respective boxplots for both choice types, and highlights the
fact that RTs for choices not in accordance with the person’s
overall value profile are significantly longer than those for own
words. Thus, subjects indeed acted as predicted by the value
theory [11] since decisions against their overall value profile took
longer.
It has to be noted that a subdivision of subjects based on the
typology dimension ‘individualism vs. collectivism’ was the only
statistically testable distinction. Further subdivisions with regard to
the different levels of complexity (i.e., the hierarchical element of
the value theories) could not be reliably established. Therefore, the
following analyses of group fMRI data are based on this result of
the two-step cluster analysis, i.e. a subdivision of participants into
individualists and collectivists. Such a subdivision of subjects is in
line with our presumptions of the integrating value theories. This
prerequisite provides the relevant basis for the interpretation of the
neurobiological correlates.
Differences in brain activation between individualists and
collectivists
How is this behavioural differentiation of value preferences
represented in the brain? Based on the behavioural characteristics
of collectivists and individualists as provided by the value theories
[1–11] it could be hypothesized that collectivists would weigh the
given opportunities, also taking their possible repercussion to other
people into account, whereas individualists might be more self-
centred when making their choice, only bearing in mind the
repercussion of their decision on themselves.
The fMRI data of all subjects were analysed for a main effect of
factor ‘group’ to identify overall differences in brain activity
between individualists and collectivists. Both groups recruited the
brain network for reading [16–17] (Broca’s area [areas 44, 45],
posterior inferior temporal gyrus, and occipito-temporal transition
on the fusiform gyrus).
But the general processing strategies on all decisions (either
congruent, i.e. collectivists chose collectivistic values and individ-
ualists chose individualistic values, or incongruent, i.e. collectivists
chose individualistic values and vice versa) differed between groups
(Fig. 3): Collectivists showed significantly stronger activation (main
effect COL . IND) within left rostral inferior parietal cortex (IPL,
area PFt [18–19]) and intraparietal sulcus (IPS, areas hIP1, hIP2
[20]), the right midcingulate cortex (area 24; MCC [21]) at the
border to the medial superior frontal gyrus (mSFG), and the right
middle frontal gyrus (MFG). Conversely, individualists showed a
significantly stronger activation (main effect IND . COL) in the
superficial part of the left amygdala (area SF [22]).
Whereas collectivists recruited a network of cortical brain areas,
individualists showed stronger activation of a subcortical structure.
Such differential recruitment of cortical vs. subcortical structures
points to fundamentally different strategies of individualists and
collectivists when facing decisions. This is even more important
when considering that these structures belong to different systems,
Moral Concepts Set Decision Strategies
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 April 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 4 | e18451
Moral Concepts Set Decision Strategies
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 April 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 4 | e18451
i.e. the amygdala to the limbic system (for the individualists) and
frontal and parietal areas to association cortices (for the
collectivists). The following paragraphs should elucidate on the
basis of the existing literature how these neurobiological correlates
might reflect differential ways of thinking for persons with different
moral concepts as hypothesized based on the value theories.
Collectivists recruited three different cortical brain regions
during their decisions. Characterizing the different contributing
areas of the network would provide a cue on how these areas
might be used in collectivists to reach a decision. If there exists a
neurobiological correlate for the value-theory driven hypothesis
that collectivists would weigh the given alternatives, especially with
regard to an acceptable outcome for others, one would expect at
least two different requirements to be fulfilled: (i) ability to weigh
alternatives with regard to their outcome (such as detection of
potential failures or bad options), and (ii) appreciation of others
with judgement about their needs. The possibility to fulfil these
requirements should therefore be provided by areas of the
recruited cortical brain network.
One area recruited by the collectivists was the left IPL/IPS
region, which has been implicated in non-spatial stimulus
selection. According to Mevorach et al. [25], during stimulus
selection, the left IPL/IPS provides a top-down control of
extrastriate visual areas to regulate the processing of non-salient
stimuli, thus enabling the subject to ignore salient aspects and
choose non-salient stimuli [26]. The effect does not seem to reflect
task difficulty, since no increased activation in left IPL/IPS was
found when the task was simply made more difficult without a
corresponding change in saliency [27–28]. Based on these former
studies, the recruitment of the left IPL/IPS by the collectivistic
group could be interpreted as enabling the person, for each word
pair, to reject the possibly at first most salient word. Instead,
collectivists were also able to appreciate the less salient word and
choose it. It has to be noted that, in the present study, such a
Table 1. Stimulus words used for the fMRI paradigm (six categories, six words each).
collectivistic 1. level 2. level 3. level
(context of family) (context of peer group) (context of mankind)
‘Zusammengeho¨rigkeit’ ‘Sicherheit’ ‘Menschlichkeit’
togetherness safety Humanity
‘Geborgenheit’ ‘Sorgfalt’ ‘Harmonie’
protection diligence harmony
‘Familie’ ‘Loyalita¨t’ ‘Gemeinschaft’
family loyalty community
‘Tradition’ ‘Verantwortung’ ‘Teamfa¨higkeit’
tradition responsibility teamwork
‘Zusammenhalt’ ‘Gerechtigkeit’ ‘Konvention’
solidarity fairness convention
‘Besta¨ndigkeit’ ‘Maßsta¨be’ ‘Geselligkeit’
constancy standards sociability
individualistic 1. level 2. level 3. level
(context of self) (context of peer group) (context of mankind)
‘Spaß’ ‘Erfolg’ ‘Flexibilita¨t’
fun success flexibility
‘Kreativita¨t’ ‘Selbsta¨ndigkeit’ ‘Wertscha¨tzung’
creativity autonomy esteem
‘Macht’ ‘Kompetenz’ ‘Unabha¨ngigkeit’
power competence independence
‘Status’ ‘Leistung’ ‘Nachsicht’
status performance indulgence
‘Respekt’ ‘Risikobereitschaft’ ‘Hingabe’
respect risk-taking commitment
‘Herausforderung’ ‘Zielstrebigkeit’ ‘Selbstentfaltung’
challenge determination self-development
The stimulus words in the table are given as the original German word (in single quotation marks) and as the English translation beneath (in italics). Words and their
ordering are based on the open systems theory of values [10–11] and related theories [1–9].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018451.t001
Figure 1. Categories of values as obtained from the value theories. Bar graphs show for each of the six categories the mean count of choices
made by the subjects in the MR scanner, averaged over the two groups (Individualists: grey bars, Collectivists: black bars) derived from the two-step
cluster-analysis. Error bars provide the standard deviation. Significant differences between groups are indicated by asterisks (ANOVA for interaction
between factor ‘group’ and ‘value orientation of stimulus’, P,0.001, df = 1, individual F-values within figure).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018451.g001
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saliency effect could be observed on abstract value words, not
objects as in former studies [25–28]. This might provide further
hints that this effect is a more general principle which only was
assumed so far [26].
The MCC was linked to error detection and response selection
[29–30], aiming at avoidance of a bad outcome [31]. Thus,
behaviour will be reorganized to promote actions which can
effectively avoid future harm. This theory of MCC function was
originally based on pain and distress studies [32–33], but later also
established for other kinds of cognitive processing with the need
for avoiding a bad outcome [34–35]. In meta-analyses, it was
furthermore stressed that especially this part of the cingulate cortex
forms the cognitive division, being activated in cognitively
demanding tasks. This could involve motor-response selection
tasks, tasks with divided attention or with competing streams of
information [36–37]. Especially for the intersection between MCC
and mSFG, as found in the present study, the concept of
counterfactual thinking has lately been proposed [38]. This
concept enables the person to ask what would have happened if
the decision had been the other way round. The involvement of
the mSFG particularly refers to counterfactual reasoning about
action versus inaction. Here, the mSFG serves as an internal
action monitor, which also includes the suppression of a prepotent
action or monitoring the outcome of a self-selected action [38–41].
Thus, the activation of the present study could likely be interpreted
as serving as a ‘‘response monitor’’ for the selection process
required when choosing between two abstract values. But the
mSFG activation could furthermore play a role in the social
context of the decision process. It was reported that mSFG was
involved in forming judgements about other people, especially
concerning the reputation a person has in view of another [42–44].
Being only activated in the collectivists, they seem to use this
cortical region to carefully weigh their possibilities to reach the
best possible solution with the best outcome for them and for
others, also taking care of their reputation.
The MFG was found to be active during self-other differenti-
ation processes, enabling the subject to ascribe a mental state to
another person in relation to one’s own [45]. As part of the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 46 and 9), this region seems to
be involved in social reasoning. It was shown that the MFG plays a
role in the evaluation of the fairness and permissibility of
behaviour as demonstrated by fMRI and transcranial magnetic
stimulation neuroeconomical studies [46–48]. This involvement in
socially relevant decisions was further supported by studies in
which social norms were violated, pointing to a respective
evaluative function of the right MFG in particular [48–50]. In
Table 2. Characteristics of groups COL and IND with regard to age, sex, and personality structure.
Group IND Group COL P-Values F-Values
Age and IQ (standardized data, m=100, s=15)
N males 10 11
N females 4 13
age 6 SD 35.60612.93 37.91613.82 0.34 F1,35= 0.96
age male 6 SD 36.55612.72 43.10613.60 0.25 F2,35= 1.44
age female 6 SD 33.00615.12 33.92613.11
IQ 6 SD 124.3369.88 120.35610.55 0.23 F1,35= 1.51
IQ male 6 SD 125.4069.84 118.20613.25 0.48 F2,35= 0.76
IQ female 6 SD 122.25611.15 122.0068.09
Personality structure (standardized data, range 0–4)
Dimension ‘Neuroticism’ 1.6060.66 1.5360.65 0.76
Dimension ‘Extraversion’ 2.3660.42 2.3460.53 0.89
Dimension ‘Openness’ 2.6060.54 2.3160.50 0.10
Dimension ‘Agreeableness’ 2.4960.41 2.7660.47 0.08
Dimension ‘Conscientiousness’ 2.7160.49 3.0160.38 0.04 * F1,36= 4.65, Wilks’ l = 0.87
All data are given as mean 6 standard deviation (SD). Scores on the intelligence quotient (IQ) were derived from the culture-free test CFT-20 [83], scores on the five
personality dimensions were derived from the NEO-FFI [84]. Testing for statistical significance was performed using a MANCOVA (age, IQ), and discriminant analysis
(NEO-FFI). Significant results are indicated by an asterisk.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018451.t002
Figure 2. Results of the statistical analysis of scaled reaction
times of different trial types. Box plots show mean scaled reaction
times with percentiles for the two choice types choice for a word in
accordance with one’s own value profile (choice own), and choice for a
word not in accordance with the own value profile (choice other).
ANOVA (P,0.0001) revealed a significant effect of factor ‘choice type’ as
marked by the asterisk.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018451.g002
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moral dilemma situations, this region is also involved, assumed to
provide the normative evaluation when different moral goals
conflict with each other [51]. Thus, the involvement of the MFG
in the present study could be interpreted as being the ‘‘social
monitor’’, comparable to the ‘‘response monitor’’ of the MCC/
mSFG region, in a situation where collectivists had to decide
between different abstract moral values. Especially the fairness and
social permissibility aspect might be essential for the collectivists,
deduced from their orientation towards other people. Even when
deciding in an abstract fashion, collectivists seemed to try to find
Figure 3. Significant brain activations for the main effects of factor ‘group’. (A) Main effect COL . IND: Coronal and sagittal sections of the
MNI single subject template, showing significant activation (p,0.05 cluster-level corrected, extent threshold k= 200 voxels), labelled in red) within
left rostral inferior parietal lobule (PFt) [18–19] and intraparietal sulcus (hIP1, hIP2) [20], cluster size: 833 voxels, T210= 4.45, peak MNI coordinates:
x=246, y=232, z= 33); right middle cingulate cortex (MCC, BA24) [21] at the border to medial superior frontal gyrus (mSFG), cluster size: 285 voxels,
T210= 4.16, peak MNI coordinates: x=3, y= 16, z= 33; right middle frontal gyrus (MFG), cluster size: 577 voxels, T210= 4.16, peak MNI coordinates:
x= 39, y= 26, z=42. (B) Main effect IND . COL: Coronal section of the MNI single subject template, showing significant activation (puncorr. ,0.001,
extent threshold k= 10, labelled in red) within the superficial part of the left amygdala (SF [22]), cluster size: 61 voxels, T210= 4.02, peak MNI
coordinates: x=220, y=22, z=221. For reading convenience, surrounding areas of the Ju¨lich-Du¨sseldorf cytoarchitectonic atlas [23] as displayed by
the SPM anatomy toolbox [24] are labelled in yellow whereas areas found to be active in the present study are labelled in red. Yellow labelled area
codes are as follows: hIP1/hIP2: areas of anterior intraparietal sulcus, M1: primary motor cortex, area PF: area of rostral inferior parietal lobule, SI:
primary somatosensory cortex, SII: secondary somatosensory cortex, SPL: superior parietal lobule, area 6: premotor cortex. Bar plots beneath (for A)
and beside (for B) each section show the parameter estimates (i.e. the strength of the BOLD-effect for each condition as measured during fMRI,
revealing if and to what degree the each condition contributed to the observed activation) at peak MNI coordinates for collectivists (COL; green), and
individualists (IND; red) when choosing either individualistic (VIND) or collectivistic values (VCOL). Error bars provide the standard error.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018451.g003
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the fairest solution when making their choice between two abstract
values. Therefore, again the present study points to a more general
principle of socially relevant decision-making, irrespective of an
actual situation.
Interpreting the possible role of this cortical brain network
recruited by the collectivists during the decision process, their
strategy might likely be called a ‘balancing and weighing strategy’.
This was hypothesized based on the behavioural characteristics of
the collectivists. The recruited brain areas contribute different
aspects of this strategy, since they enable the collectivists to weigh
both alternatives and try to detect possible errors or any social
unfairness in their decision, aiming at finding the optimal choice
for everyone. Together, these areas form a cortical brain network
which is recruited by the collectivist to apply their orientation
towards other people with an altruistic attitude to decision
processes, underpinning our theory-driven hypothesis of how a
neurobiological correlate of a collectivistic moral concept might be
organized to reach a decision.
For individualists, on the contrary, a different strategy would be
hypothesized based on their behavioural characteristics. According
to the value theories, individualists would most likely focus the
outcome of their decision to their personal advantage or benefit.
The potential neurobiological correlate of such a strategy was at
least completely different from the one of the collectivistic strategy,
i.e. the involvement of a subcortical limbic structure in contrast to
a network of cortical association regions.
The only activation found to be more active in the individualists
than the collectivists was the superficial part SF of the left
amygdala. The amygdala was implicated in processing of stimuli
which are either arousing or emotional. Here, the emotional
valence could have been either positive or negative [52–56].
Spoken in a more general fashion, the amygdala seems to process
the relevance of a stimulus in a personal situation. Ascribing this
role to the amygdala might point to possible differential response
mechanisms of the amygdala in different people, depending on
their interpretation of the situation [55–56]. The preponderance
of amygdala activation in only one of two groups of people in the
present study, i.e. the individualists, supports this theory. It shows
that a person’s mindset and general value orientation might be one
factor which influences their point of view and consecutively, the
response characteristic of the amygdala. The specific activation of
only the superficial part SF of the amygdala further supports the
current interpretation of the amygdala providing the social
information within the decision process of the present study. This
SF region was found to be important for continuous evaluation of
socially relevant situations [57–58]. Having found activation only
in the left amygdala seems to further support the so far proposed
interpretation: In two meta-analyes the left amygdala was found to
be not only involved in pure negative emotion processing, but
furthermore in a sustained evaluation process of the emotional
valence and arousal of the stimulus [59–60].
Thus, the strategy of the individualists might be interpreted as a
‘fight-and-flight’-strategy. They did not try to weigh each decision in
each possible way as the collectivists did, but aimed at detecting the
social relevance, and consecutively, the possible menace of the
decision with regard to their own social status. Behaviourally, this is
in accordance with the individualists’ orientation to egocentric
values. Based on the value theories, it was assumed that
individualists would focus on their personal outcome when facing
a decision. The neurobiological correlate of such a strategy found in
the present study supports this notion, but also reveals the
fundamental difference to the strategy of the collectivists: individ-
ualists seemed to be more emotionally engaged in a decision
process, entering a different level of processing than collectivists.
It has to be stressed that these differential strategies were found
in decisions on abstract moral values, irrespective of an actual
situation, in contrast to the referenced literature. Thus, moral
concepts and general value orientations provide principle brain
mechanisms for the subject of how to approach a decision. Here,
brain regions beyond the known cingulate and prefrontal regions
which are recruited during actual moral conflict situations [12–15]
were involved.
Taken together, these findings could support the notion of two
main components existing within the complex of ‘morality’: moral
reasoning (cognition) and moral feelings (emotion), which are
supported by different networks of cortical (cognition) and
subcortical (emotion) areas [61–63]. Together with studies on
antisocial and psychopathic behaviour it was argued that either
one or the other system might be impaired in antisocial
individuals, mainly preventing them from having a feeling for
morality (emotion component) [61]. Comparable to that dichot-
omy, we could hypothesize that the two components of morality,
i.e. emotion vs. cognition, are generally demanded differently,
depending on the predominant moral concept of a person.
Whereas collectivists seem to concentrate on moral reasoning
aspects when solving a decision, individualists are more involved
with the moral emotion aspect. It can be assumed that in principle,
all people have access to both components of moral decision
making. But depending on their current moral concept, the one or
the other component outweighs the other. The idea of the
integrating value theories [10–11] that every person is in principle
equipped with either moral concept, switching between the
different manifestations depending on their social and professional
situation, provides the theoretical background for such an
interpretation. Thus, our results provide a new aspect to the
discussion about the possible dichotomy of moral judgement,
showing that even in healthy, psychosocially normal persons, one
or the other component (cognition or emotion) might be
dominant.
In context of psychopathic behaviour and possible impair-
ments in the neural circuits of morality, it was argued that
antisocial behaviour is to occur first, and then causes a switch in
moral thinking, not vice versa. This was explained as a need to
adjust moral thinking to repeated (antisocial) activities to reduce
cognitive dissonance [64–66]. With respect to healthy, psycho-
socially normal persons, a comparable causal system could be
assumed: If the moral concept of a person shifts depending on
his or her social or professional situation [10–11], the
predominance of one or the other component of moral
judgement might shift sequentially to adjust the decision
processes to every day life. On the contrary, it seems unlikely
that a shift in the decision making system would precede a shift
of the overall moral concept. But for this problem, our results
provide only first hints for one of the two possibilities, leaving a
further investigation for future studies.
To our knowledge, this is the first study which experimentally
investigates neurobiological correlates of how a person’s mindset
might influence the way of decision making. With our design, we
were able to find behavioural data which distinguished subjects
based on their overall value profile which provided the basis for
consecutive analysis of possible neurobiological correlates. The
interpretation of these findings must remain tentative. But based
on the insights gained from the present study, showing that
subjects can be grouped with regard to their overall value concept,
and that neurobiological correlates could be identified for such a
distinction, modelling of the second part of psychological value
research, i.e. the different levels of increasing complexity could be
a challenge for future studies.
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Conflict processing in individualists and collectivists
This difference in processing strategies between individualists
and collectivists when facing abstract value decisions lead to the
question if these decisions on abstract values also bear a conflict
potential which might involve comparable brain areas as found in
actual moral dilemma situations. Such conflicts might then be
experienced and processed differently in persons with different
moral concepts. We tested this hypothesis by taking the non-
chosen words in each trial as a possible conflict reason. Thus, the
fMRI data of both groups were re-analysed, sorting the trials into
non-chosen individualistic and collectivistic words, assuming that
the volunteers might have experienced a conflict when they did
not choose in accordance with their overall value profile.
A first hint to such conflict situations was provided by the
subjects’ reports when debriefing them after scanning. Subjects
reported that in most trials they easily chose one of the two
presented words. But there were also trials in which both words
were equally wrong for them, causing the subjects to feel that their
choice would be equally bad. Furthermore, there were trials in
which both words were equally good, which caused subjects to
have a problem with choosing one of them. Finally, there were
trials in which subjects experienced that they did not chose in line
with the rest of their decisions, a fact which made them feel angry.
To test if this assumption also has a behavioural basis derived
from the data during the experiment, we analysed the reaction
times (RT) to different stimuli, taking the RTs as an indicator for
potential conflict [1–11]. Thus, RTs were grouped according to
the sorting of the trials, providing four different groups of RTs: 1.
both words belonged to the overall value profile of the subject
(positive conflict); 2. neither of the words belonged to the overall
value profile of the subject (negative conflict); 3. only one word
belonged to the value profile of the subject, and the participant
chose in accordance with the own value profile (no conflict –
positive decision); 4. only one word belonged to the value profile of
the subject, but the participant did not choose in accordance with
the own value profile (no conflict – negative decision). Based on
the value theories it could be hypothesized that trials of group 1
and 4 would cause a potential conflict, because they resulted in not
having chosen a word of one’s own value profile.
To statistically test this hypothesis, RTs for each trial type were
first scaled for each subject individually by the mean RT of each
subject because averaged RTs differed considerably between
subjects. Scaled RTs entered an ANOVA to test if RTs of the
four trial types differed significantly from each other across subjects.
The ANOVA was significant at P,0.0001 (F3,148=21.23) for a
main effect of the factor ‘trial type’. Thus, consecutive multiple
comparison testing was applied to identify those pairs of trial types
for which RTs differed from each other. These tests revealed that
RTs of trial types 1 and 4 were significantly longer than those of trial
types 2 and 3. This shows that the decision process for trials 1 and 4
took longer than for trials 2 and 3. Together with the reports of the
subjects after scanning, this result is a further hint that decisions
were experienced differently depending on the trial type, with
greater potential for conflict when a word of one own’s value profile
was not chosen. Statistical results are summarized in Figure 4.
Based on these behavioural peculiarities, we re-analysed the
respective brain data to investigate if such behavioural differences
have a correlate in brain activity, referring to the different trial
types as different potential conflicts which subjects experienced.
In this analysis, the brain network for reading was found again.
Additionally, a significant interaction effect was found in two brain
regions: left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) at the border
region between BA46 and BA10, and right medial superior frontal
gyrus (mSFG, maximum 1) at the transition to the midcingulate
cortex (area 24, MCC, maximum 2) [21] (Fig. 5).
Activation within these brain regions was driven by those trials
in which subjects rejected their predominant value, i.e. collectivists
rejected collectivistic and individualists rejected individualistic
values (Fig. 5A). Thus, these brain regions were significantly
involved when subjects experienced a conflict. Refusing a
congruent value was possible either when two ‘wrong’ values
constituted a trial (DILEMMA condition), or when one word of
each value type was presented but subjects made a ‘wrong’
decision, i.e. not congruent with their dominant value profile
(WORSE-CHOICE condition). Thus, a consecutive region of
interest (ROI) analysis was carried out to identify the condition
which perplexed subjects the most (Fig. 5B): While individualists
recruited mSFG only during the WORSE-CHOICE condition,
collectivists used this brain region equally in both conditions. A
mirror-inverted activation pattern was found in MCC. Within
DLPFC, activation did not differ between groups, but was
generally higher for the WORSE-CHOICE than for the
DILEMMA condition.
Having not chosen in accordance with the own value concept
thus indeed caused a conflict and involved comparable brain areas
as found in moral dilemma situations [12–15]. Here, the DLPFC
was ascribed the role of a rule keeper, providing general rules for
persons’ behaviour in decision processes [67]. This region may
interact with other frontal regions [68], such as the mSFG/MCC.
Both collectivists and individualists recruited the DLPFC equally
strong, with a slight preponderance during the WORSE-CHOICE
condition, which might reflect an equally high need for general rules
in a decision process. But in individualists, the processing of this
conflict was mainly supported by recruitment of the mSFG, showing
that the conflict was caused by the counterfactual thinking which
reveals that it would have been possible to choose a congruent value
in accordance with the own value profile. Taking the social
relevance of the mSFG into account as well [42–45], this
preponderant activation of the mSFG in individualists might again
show that they try to do what is best for themselves but perhaps
mainly because they want to be seen in a good light by others (i.e.
reputation). The WORSE-CHOICE condition might provide a
situation in which the individualists fear a loss of their reputation
because they chose contrary to their ‘normal’ choices. Collectivists,
on the other hand, additionally activated the MCC, trying to detect
if there was an error in the decision. This again matches their
behavioural characteristics of orientation towards other people.
Thus, the conflict analysis supports the notion of different
strategies for individualists and collectivists when facing value-
based decisions.
Conclusion and outlook
The present study demonstrates that persons with different
value preferences apply different neural strategies when facing a
decision. These neurobiological correlates reflect hypotheses
derived from behavioural characteristics of persons with different
moral concepts. As shown for decisions independent of an actual
situation, the current analysis provides a general basis for the
understanding of decision processes in the brain. Brain areas
beyond those activated in actual moral dilemma situations were
found to be involved. It remains for future studies to elucidate if
neural correlates can also be established for other typological or
hierarchical characteristics of values, beyond those found here for
the value typology ‘individualism vs. collectivism’. Since value
theories have also been applied to economics, leadership, and
organizational research [69–70], including cultural differences [6],
understanding of the neurobiological basics of value processing in
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persons with different value preferences is likely to have a
profound impact on future research in these areas.
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
The experimental setup of the study was approved by the local
Ethics Committee of the RWTH Aachen University, Germany.
Written informed consent was obtained from all participants.
Participants
38 healthy volunteers participated in the experiment (21 males,
mean age 6 SD =39.67613.25, range 22 – 61; 17 female, mean
age 6 SD =33.71613.11, range 19 – 59). All participants were
native German speakers and had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision. Subjects had no known history of neurological or
psychiatric disorders. One male subject was excluded from the
brain data analysis due to failure of pre-processing of the data, thus
only being considered for the behavioural analysis.
Experimental design, stimuli, and stimulus presentation
Each participant performed a functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) forced-choice paradigm on words with value-based
meanings. These words were generated based on psychological
theories and general concepts of human basic values [1–11].
Following these classification of values, two main sections of values
Figure 4. Results of the statistical analysis of scaled reaction times of different trial types. (A) Box plots showing mean scaled reaction
times with percentiles for the four trial types positive conflict (pos conf), negative conflict (neg conf), no conflict – positive decision (no conf pos), and
no conflict – negative decision (no conf neg). ANOVA (P,0.0001) revealed a significant effect of factor ‘trial type’. Asterisks mark those pairwise
comparisons which proved to be significant during consecutive multiple comparison testing. (B) Dot plots showing for trial type ‘pos conf’ (left panel,
black bar) and ‘no conf neg’ (right panel, black bar) that their reaction times were significantly different from trials ‘neg conf’ and ‘no conf pos’ (red
bars), but not from each other (grey bar). Bars mark the standard error of each estimated mean scaled reaction time (marked as dots).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018451.g004
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could be differentiated: individualistic (i.e. self-centred) and
collectivistic (i.e. group-oriented) values. Within these two sections
a further differentiation of values is possible with respect to their
relation to other individuals, providing an ordering of values
referring to increasing complexity: at a first level, the most basic
values appear, encompassing only the individual itself and
significant others; at the second level, values in relation to peer
groups, like colleagues, friends etc., are based; at the third level,
values with relation to every other person are grouped. This
hierarchical ordering system of values and value development in
humans is based on early psychological theories of e.g. Piaget [4],
Maslow [9] or Kohlberg [5]. In total, six value categories were used
within the current experiment.
For each of the six word categories, six different words were
generated based on words provided in value theories [1–11]. Since
German language is case sensitive concerning nouns (capital initial
letters) and verbs or adjectives (small initial letters), it was assured that
only nouns were chosen as stimulus words for the paradigm. Verb-
or adjective-derived nouns were excluded in order to control for
syntactic word category. In order to generate accurate German
words with different value meanings, translations of words from these
earlier studies [1–11] were checked for the most selective synonym
using the German Duden glossary of synonyms [71]. This procedure
was necessary since direct translation of words from the original
publications was not always suitable due to ambivalent meaning in
German language. Translations were double-checked for accuracy
and appropriateness by speech and language therapists of the
Neurolinguistics Department of the RWTHAachen University. The
stimulus words for all categories can be found in Table 1.
Before entering the scanner, participants were instructed on the
general design of the task, i.e. participants just knew they would
see a set of word pairs, being presented in a rapid sequence. They
were instructed to spontaneously choose the word of each word
pair which appealed most to them, independent of any actual
situation. The participants did not see the words before the start of
the experiment in the MR scanner. Explanation about the
intention of the study or the content of the stimulus words was
not provided to assure impartiality of the participants when
performing the task in the MR scanner. To assure that subjects
understood the general principle of how to choose words, they
were provided with examples from fields other than value
concepts, e.g.: ‘‘You see the words ‘vanilla flavour’ and ‘chocolate
flavour’: Which word appeals most to you, independent of any
given situation?’’ or ‘‘You see the words ‘red’ and ‘green’: Which
word appeals most to you, independent of any given situation?’’
Selection of words was indicated by button presses, using the left
index finger for the left word on the screen and the right index
finger for the right word on the screen.
After scanning, subjects were debriefed of the experiment to
ensure that the task was carried out as intended. Therefore,
subjects were asked (in accordance to former studies of value
research [1–11]) to provide a general appraisal of how they
experienced the different choice situations.
Word pairs were presented as written strings in Helvetica font at 48
pts, with one word on the left and one word on the right side of the
screen, equally distant from the centre of the screen. Each word from
each category was combined with each word from every other
category, providing a total of 540 word pairs as stimuli. Each word
appeared 30 times, 50% of the trials on the left and 50% on the right
side of the screen. This was assured not only for the overall appearance
of the word across different categories, but also for the combination of
the word with six words from one other category. This change in
position was implemented in order to avoid habituation effects or
possible preferences of the subjects for one side of the screen.
Stimuli were back-projected onto a screen placed on the back
wall of the scanner room, seen by the subjects via a small angled
mirror suspended from the top of the head coil. Stimulus
presentation was controlled by a computer placed in the control
room using Presentation software (Neurobehavioral Systems,
Albany, CA, USA).
The study employed a modified event-related design. Stimuli
were presented in randomized order, with a different randomisation
for each participant. The total duration of the experiment was about
22 minutes. Each trial, i.e. presentation of each word pair, lasted 1.3
seconds, followed by a blank screen for 1 second, providing an inter-
stimulus interval of 2.3 seconds. The combination of the total trial
duration (2.3 s) and the fMRI repetition time (2.5 s; cf next
paragraph) resulted in distributed sampling serving as a temporal
jitter [72–73]. The distributed sampling procedure was chosen
instead of a jitter by implementation of a variable time period
between each trial onset to ensure equally short trial durations for
each and every trial. Such rapid presentation of stimuli was chosen
to reliably detect the relevant effect of how values are processed in
the brain. According to the value theories [1–11], a short
presentation of stimulus words is essential to gain an unbiased view
of a person’s mindset. Otherwise, a potential bias might be
introduced if subjects are given too much time to rethink their
answer. A further advantage was the increased number of stimuli for
each value category presented in a reasonable total time frame,
which increases statistical power [74–75].
Functional and anatomical magnetic resonance imaging
data acquisition
The functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiment
was carried out on a 3T Siemens Tim-TRIO scanner (Erlangen,
Germany). A standard birdcage head coil was used with foam
paddings to reduce head motion. Functional data were recorded
from the whole brain, using a gradient-echo echoplanar imaging
(EPI) sequence for blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) contrast
with the following parameters: echo time (TE) = 30 ms, flip angle
= 90u, repetition time (TR) = 2.5 s, 41 axial slices, slice thickness:
3 mm, slice distance 10%, field of view (FoV) = 2006200 mm2
with an in-plane resolution of 3 mm63 mm.
After the experimental EPI runs, a high-resolution T1-weighted
anatomical image was obtained for later normalisation of the EPI
data into MNI space using a 3D-MPRAGE sequence (176 axial
Figure 5. Significant brain activation and consecutive ROI-based analysis for non-selected words. (A) Sagittal and horizontal section of
the MNI single subject template, showing significant activation (puncorr,0.001, extent threshold k= 150) within the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex at
the border to the frontal pole region (DLPFC (BA46/BA10), cluster size: 168 voxels, MNI coordinates of peak activity: x=227, y=56, z=15), and the
medial superior frontal gyrus (mSFG, cluster size: 315 voxels, maximum 1, MNI coordinates of peak activity: x= 6, y= 35, z= 36) at the border to the
middle cingulate cortex (MCC (BA24 [19]), maximum 2, MNI coordinates of peak activity: x=2, y= 45, z= 30). Bar plots beneath the sections show the
parameter estimates (i.e. the strength of the BOLD-effect for each condition as measured during fMRI, revealing if and to what degree the each
condition contributed to the observed activation) as in Fig. 2. (B) ROI-based analysis in the same brain regions as in A, beneath the respective section
of A. The MCC/mSFG cluster was separated for this analysis by applying a significance threshold of puncorr,0.0005 to the statistical map of A, allowing
for a separate extraction of parameter estimates at each maximum individually. Each graph shows the parameter estimates of activations for the two
incongruent conditions (DILEMMA, WORSE-CHOICE). Error bars provide the standard error.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018451.g005
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slices, TR =2.25 s; TE = 3.03 ms, FoV =2566256 mm2, flip
angle = 9u, final voxel resolution: 1 mm61 mm61 mm).
Image analysis
Data were processed using MATLAB 7 (The Mathworks Inc.,
Natick, USA) and the SPM 5 software package (Wellcome
Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK, http://
www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk). Pre-processing of each data set included the
standard procedures of realignment, normalisation to the MNI
single subject template [76] and spatial smoothing with an 8 mm
FWHM Gaussian kernel. The anatomical images served as
reference for the transformation to the MNI reference brain, co-
registering all functional EPI images to the corresponding
anatomical data set, using the unified segmentation approach [77].
For the statistical analysis at the single subject level, trials were
assigned to the six word categories individually for each subject,
using the subject’s decision on each word pair as the categorizing
variable (individual selection of trials from each subject’s
Presentation log-files, providing six trial categories). Failure to
choose a word within the time frame of the inter-stimulus interval
of 2.3 seconds was counted as a missed trial. The respective trials
were excluded from further analysis. The whole study and analysis
applied a modified event-related design to optimally model the
relevant time periods of such cognitive experiment [78]. Having
single events (presentation of each pair of stimulus words as trials),
the durations of each trial were set as very short blocks according
to the reaction time of the subjects. I.e. the end of each trial was set
individually for each trial at the time of the button press, giving
variable trial durations. Variable durations for each trial were used
in order to model the relevant time period of the BOLD signal
during stimulus attainment, cognitive processing of the stimulus,
and decision most accurately. Variable trial durations did not
enter any further analyses beyond first-level single subject analyses,
neither as additional parameters nor as regressors or covariates.
Thus, the relevant block functions resembled such block functions
which are known from blocked designs. In the present study, each
‘‘block’’ is in fact a mini-block with duration of several hundred
milliseconds (i.e. the reaction time in the individual trial), with steep
increase of the slope at stimulus onset, remaining on the activity
plateau for the short period until button press (reaction time), and final
return to baseline. The duration of the plateau phase was variable,
depending on the reaction time to each stimulus. The respective block
functions for each category were then convolved with a canonical
hemodynamic response function (HRF) with its first derivative to allow
for a more flexible and thus optimised fit to the experimental data.
According to the Linearity Theory for event-related designs with
stimulus-onset asynchrony of around 1 second [79–80], overlapping
HRFs from consecutive trials (due to rapid sequence of events) could
be separated from each other assuming additive effects for the
emergent total HRF. For each participant, the contrasts of each
category vs. the implicit resting baseline as implemented in SPM were
calculated. This implicit resting baseline consisted of all blank-screen
intervals between the stimuli. When reaction times were longer than
the stimulus presentation time, thus overlapping with the blank-screen
period, only the rest of the blank-screen period after the button press
was considered for the implicit resting baseline.
For the group analysis, the individual contrast images of all six
categories were entered into a repeated-measures ANOVA as a
second-level random effects analysis. A factorial design was
implemented with factors ‘‘subject’’, ‘‘group’’ (from the behav-
ioural analysis, either ‘‘individualistic’’ or ‘‘collectivistic’’), and
‘‘trial category’’. Coordinates are reported in standard MNI
stereotaxic coordinates as implemented in SPM 5 [81].
Statistical analysis of neuropsychological and
behavioural data
Neuropsychological and behavioural data were analysed using
SPSS 15 for Windows (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL, USA).
Behavioural data of subjects’ performance during the fMRI
experiment were tested to identify sub-groups of the participants
related to their value preferences, conducting a two-step cluster-
analysis which provides the optimum number of clusters in a given
data set (see also [82]). Six variables were entered into the analysis,
one for each category of value words. Manifestations of the
variables were the count of choices for each participant for each
value category, i.e. how often a subject chose a word from the
respective value category. The analysis was run allowing for a
maximum of 15 clusters, log-likelihood distance estimation,
Akaike’s information criterion as clustering criterion, no noise-
handling for outlier treatment, initial distance change threshold of
0, a maximum of eight branches per leaf node, and a maximum of
three depth levels. All variables were standardised during the
clustering procedure. A Bonferroni-correction for multiple com-
parisons was applied. Discriminant analyses were carried out with
step-wise inclusion of variables (inclusion criterion of p#0.05,
exclusion criterion of p$0.10), priors set to equal, and calculation
of Wilk’s lambda. The correct assignment of participants to one
group was tested with the cross-validated statistics, giving a re-
classification rate of 100% for both groups.
Outside the scanner, additional neuropsychological data were
obtained from each participant. Individual IQ testing was
administered using the short form (part 1) of the culture-free
intelligence test CFT-20 [83]. Personality traits were assessed using
the multidimensional personality inventory NEO-FFI of Costa and
McCrae [84], which assesses five robust dimensions of personality
(Table 2). These data were used to characterize the resulting
groups of the two-step cluster analysis. IQ and NEO-FFI data of
subjects were entered into a MANCOVA (for IQ together with
age) and a discriminant analysis (NEO-FFI), respectively.
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